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The history of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
been punctuated by periods of growth and retrenchment as the political
climate for regulation has responded to events, interest groups, and ide-
ology. Over the past century, Congress has repeatedly expanded the
FDA's legal powers in response to popular pressure for regulation fol-
lowing a public health crisis,' and then tightened the agency's leash in
t © 2007 by Rebecca S. Eisenberg. All rights reserved.
• Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. This history is recounted in detail in PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (2003) and
sources cited therein. Congress was driven to pass the original Food and Drug Act of 1906 by
public outcry following the publication of a series of magazine articles exposing fraudulent
and dangerous practices by sellers of "patent medicines" and of Upton Sinclair's novel, The
Jungle, exposing unsavory practices in the food industry, Id. at 46-55. A few years earlier,
Congress had passed the Biologics Act of 1902 following outbreaks of infections and some
deaths from sales of contaminated batches of antitoxin and vaccines. Id. at 68-69. Passage of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which expanded the FDA's authorities to require
proof of safety before drugs could be marketed, followed the deaths of over 100 patients
(mostly children) from ingesting a lethal batch of sulfanilamide, one of the first antibiotics. Id.
at 89-93. Congress further expanded the FDA's authorities to require proof of efficacy as well
as safety in 1962, with passage of the Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, in the face of public alarm following births of children with deformed limbs
whose mothers had been given thalidomide to prevent miscarriage (a use for which the drug
was ineffective). Id. at 144-65. In each of these instances, the legislative reform initiative
gained a crucial boost from public alarm over a recent crisis to overcome what had previously
seemed like insurmountable opposition.
Congress currently faces proposals to expand the FDA's authority with regard to post-
approval clinical trials and labeling changes in the wake of revelations concerning the cardio-
vascular side effects of Vioxx. See, e.g., The Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of
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response to pressure from industry and opponents of regulation during
periods of ascendancy for free market ideology.2 Throughout this period
the most politically compelling arguments in favor of regulation empha-
sized public health and the protection of patients from unknown hazards,
while the most compelling arguments against regulation emphasized the
interests of patients and doctors in making their own therapeutic choices
unfettered by government regulation
A different set of tradeoffs has figured in the debate about drug pat-
ents. The pharmaceutical industry, lobbying for stronger patent laws
throughout the world, has sung the praises of the patent system as a
means of promoting costly and risky investments in research and devel-
opment ("R&D"). In contrast, public health advocates, calling for
restrictions on patent rights, have stressed the importance of improving
access to drugs for people who otherwise cannot afford them. When
drug regulation is mentioned in these debates, it is typically invoked by
the patent advocates, who cite it as a large part of the cost of drug devel-
opment that can only be recovered if firms are allowed to charge patent-
protected premium prices for new products. This framing suggests a
symbiotic tension between patents and drug regulation: patents protect
the rents that make drug regulation affordable to innovating firms, while
the public health imperative for regulation fortifies the justification for
patent protection. It also suggests that the public health goals that justify
drug regulation are in competition with the innovation goals that justify
the patent system. In this picture, patents promote innovation by making
it profitable, while drug regulation deters innovation, in furtherance of
the competing goal of public health, by making it costly.
2007, S. 484, 110th Cong. (introduced Feb. 1, 2007); Food and Drug Administration Safety
Act of 2005, S. 930, 109th Cong. (introduced Apr. 27, 2005).
2. Again, Hilts provides a comprehensive summary of the past century of opposition
to FDA regulation, including, within recent memory, the efforts of the Office of Management
and Budget in the Reagan administration in the 1980s, HILTs, supra note 1, at 210-54, and of
the House Republicans under the leadership of Newt Gingrich in the 1990s. Id. at 295-331.
These efforts have typically been more successful in curtailing the resources available to the
FDA than in curtailing its legal authorities, although a notable exception was passage of the
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417 (codified as
amended at scattered provisions of 21 U.S.C.), which limits the authority of the FDA to regu-
late dietary supplements, vitamins, and herbal remedies sold for therapeutic purposes.
For different historical perspectives, see PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE (1980);
JOHN ABRAHAM, SCIENCE, POLITICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1995); Richard
A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV.
1753 (1996).
3. For a recent articulation, see Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470,
vacated, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
4. See, e.g., Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innova-
tion: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363 (2000).
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Framing the relationship between patents and drug regulation in this
manner is seriously incomplete and out of date. It misses the important
structural role that drug regulation has come to play in promoting a valu-
able form of pharmaceutical innovation-the development of credible
information about the effects of drugs. If a century ago the goal of drug
regulation was to protect people from poisons, today drug regulation
guides the development of information that turns poisons, used advis-
edly, into drugs.
Empirically tested knowledge about effects in patients is what dis-
tinguishes the products we call "drugs" from similar products sold in
minimally regulated markets, sometimes for similar purposes (including
many of the products sold on the shelves of health food stores). Creating
new molecules has become easier with new technologies, but determin-
ing which molecules are safe and therapeutically effective remains
stubbornly expensive, time-consuming, and risky. Information about
drug effects is an extremely valuable resource for guiding sound thera-
peutic choices, as well as for guiding the development of better products
in the future. For the most part, we rely on drug-developing firms to pro-
duce this information. There is good reason, however, to worry about the
motivation of firms to supply this information in an unregulated market.
In addition to the spillover problems that dampen R&D incentives for
many information-enriched products, market incentives to generate rig-
orous information about the effects of drugs are distorted by the risk that
better information could as readily undermine the commercial value of
the products under study as enhance it.' Pharmaceutical firms sell drugs
rather than selling information as such, and they face powerful incentives
to cheat in developing and selectively disclosing information about their
products in order to improve sales. Inducing firms to provide high qual-
ity information about the effects of drugs in patients is thus a major
challenge for regulators.
FDA regulation has also become an important adjunct to the patent
system in protecting innovating firms from competition in product mar-
kets. The most effective regulatory power that the FDA has over the
pharmaceutical industry is its premarket approval authority,6 which per-
mits the FDA to keep new products off the market pending proof of
5. Recent examples include revelations about the cardiovascular effects of some Cox-2
inhibitors (including Vioxx) and the effects of hormone replacement therapy in postmeno-
pausal women, discussed in greater detail below. Of course, even negative information about
the effects of drugs is socially valuable, but this social value may not be captured by a firm
that relies on sales of drugs to recoup its investment in generating the information.
6. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355).
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safety and efficacy.7 Although premarket approval is understood primar-
ily as a consumer protection measure, in the past twenty years Congress
has repeatedly fine-tuned the FDA's mandate as a market gatekeeper in
ways that might be better understood in terms of innovation policy, cali-
brating the balance of costs and incentives for both innovating firms and
generic competitors. The effect has been to blur the distinction between
patents and FDA regulation as determinants of the duration of lucrative
exclusivity in pharmaceutical product markets. FDA regulation, like pat-
ent protection, confers valuable exclusionary rights as a reward for
investing in certain kinds of R&D, thereby adding to both the profits and
costs of drug development.
Indeed, as the role of the patent system in drug development has be-
come more complex and ambiguous, drug regulation has become an
increasingly important source of market exclusivity for innovating firms.
Although the pharmaceutical industry has long been famously dependent
upon patents, the term of patent protection is far from optimal for the
purpose of securing rents from sales of patented drugs. Basic "composi-
tion of matter" patents8 on drugs are typically issued in the early stages
of product development, before the effects of these molecules have been
tested in clinical trials. Much (or even all) of the term of these initial pat-
ents may have expired by the time the products are brought to market,9
leaving firms to look elsewhere for protection from generic competition.
This problem has been aggravated by the switch in expiration date for
U.S. patents from seventeen years from the issue date to twenty years
from the filing date,'0 although it is mitigated by special provisions for
patent term extension available for drug patents." In recent years firms
have become quite creative about strategies to secure "evergreening"
7. Although generic versions of previously approved products are also considered new
drugs that require FDA approval, the standard for approval of generic versions of previously
approved products is easier (and cheaper) to meet than the standard for a pioneer product.
Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (requirements for approval of pioneer product) with § 3550)
(requirements for approval of generic product).
8. The statutory categories of patentable subject matter under U.S. law include "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
9. A notable recent example is Paxil, an antidepressant that did not get to market until
the original patent on the molecule had expired. The manufacturer obtained additional patents
on different versions of the molecule, but was ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to use
these patents to stop generic competition. It nonetheless enjoyed a significant period of market
exclusivity before the FDA could entertain an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) from
a generic competitor. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
10. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified in pertinent part at 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2)).
1i. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, tit. 11, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984) (codified in pertinent part at 35 U.S.C. § 156).
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patents in order to defer the date their products go off-patent,12 but the
industry has had limited success in persuading the courts to enforce
these patents against generic competitors.'3 Meanwhile, patents have
played an expanding role in the early stages of biomedical research,
leading to a proliferation of patents on research discoveries that lie up-
stream of pharmaceutical end-product development. 4 These upstream
patents are more likely to add to the costs of drug development than they
are to add to its profits.
This Article reexamines the role of FDA regulation in motivating in-
vestment in biopharmaceutical innovation. I begin by challenging the
standard story that it is the patent system that makes drug development
profitable, and drug regulation that makes it costly, by showing how pat-
ents add to costs and how drug regulation works in tandem with patents
to protect profits. I then compare FDA-administered exclusive rights to
patents as a means of fortifying drug development incentives, suggesting
ways that FDA-administered rights might be preferable both from the
perspective of policy makers and from the perspective of firms. In the
remainder of the Article, I turn to the role of the FDA in regulating clini-
cal trials of new drugs, reconsidering its regulatory functions from the
perspective of innovation policy (i.e., motivating the provision of infor-
mation about drugs) rather than from the more conventional perspective
of protecting health and safety (i.e., keeping unsafe products off the
market). Some aspects of the current regulatory scheme, such as keeping
products off the market and limiting permissible marketing claims pend-
ing the completion of clinical trials, make more sense from this
12. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding
patent on metabolite of popular drug loratadine invalid under doctrine of anticipation by in-
herency); Geneva Pharm. v. GlaxoSmithKline, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding later-
issued patents deriving from same parent application as expired patent invalid under doctrine
of double patenting); Zenith Labs. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 19 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding no infringement of patent on metabolite of antibiotic cefadroxil because of failure of
proof that patients were making patented metabolite after ingesting off-patent drug); Smith-
Kline Beecham v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding patent on
"hemihydrate" form of drug, which patentee alleged was infringed when patients given older
"monohydrate" form converted the drug to the hemihydrate following ingestion, invalid on
grounds of prior public use in the course of clinical trials), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2005), superseded, 403 F.3d 1331 (holding same patent invalid on ground that prior patent
disclosing administration of drug to patients inherently anticipated claim to hemihydrate
form).
14. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y.
2003), aff'd, 358 F3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g & reh'g en banc denied, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13784 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unsuccessfuleffort to enforce patent on selective inhibition of
Cox-2 enzyme without inhibiting Cox-I enzyme against firms that had developed selective
Cox-2 inhibitors).
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revisionist perspective than they do from the conventional perspective.
Yet other aspects, such as the relative emphasis on pre-approval studies
over post-approval studies and the FDA-enforced secrecy of clinical trial
data, come in for new criticisms and suggest new questions for scholars
and policy makers.
I. THE CHANGING ROLE OF PATENTS IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT
Biopharmaceutical research is often held out as a shining example of
the success of the patent system in motivating private investment in
R&D. The business of drug development is characterized by unusually
large spending on research by the standards of other industries. 5 Bio-
medical research makes up a large part of overall R&D spending in both
the public and private sectors, and it is an area in which empirical studies
have found that patents really seem to matter.16 The pharmaceutical in-
dustry has long and ardently maintained that patents on drugs are crucial
to the financial viability of drug development.
15. A 2001 study from the industry-funded Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Devel-
opment estimates average costs to develop a new drug at $802 million, using self-reported
data and applying a discount rate of 11% to capitalize average out-of-pocket costs of $403
million to the point of marketing approval. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innova-
tion: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). Critics
immediately challenged this estimate as inflating the true costs. See Press Release, Public
Citizen, Tufts Drug Study Sample Is Skewed; True Figure of R&D Costs Likely Is 75 Percent
Lower (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://www.publiccitizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?
ID=954; Ceci Connolly, Price Tag for a New Drug: $802 Million: Findings of Tufts University
Study Are Disputed by Several Watchdog Groups, Washington Post, Dec. 1, 2001, at A10. See
also MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW
DRUGS (2004).
A 2003 Bain & Co. study estimated the average costs of drug development at more than
twice the number calculated in the Tufts study, citing declining R&D productivity, rising costs
of commercialization, increasing payor influence, and shorter exclusivity periods. See Jim
Gilbert et al., Rebuilding Big Pharma's Business Model, 21 IN Vivo: Bus. & MED. REP. 10,
Nov. 2003, available at http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/rebuilding-
big-pharma.pdf. These cost estimates, which include R&D costs of failed products as well as
those directly attributable to successful products, are highly sensitive to the success rate for
candidate products, rising when the success rate declines. The recent dearth of successful new
products for the pharmaceutical industry thus inevitably increases the calculated costs per
product.
16. Empirical studies indicate that this is an area where decision-makers really care
about patents when they contemplate spending money on R&D, in contrast to other fields and
industries that rate other, non-patent factors as more important. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Pro-
tecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing
Firms Patent (Or Not) 1-31 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552,
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W7552.pdf; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropri-
ating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 783 (1987).
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There are signs, however, that the patent system is not working as
well as it used to for the pharmaceutical industry. A fundamental prob-
lem with patent protection for new drugs has to do with timing.
Historically, the most valuable patents on drugs have been "composition
of matter" patents that cover the drug molecule itself, without limitation
as to use. Such patents may be enforced against competitors who make,
use, sell or import the same product for any purpose throughout the pat-
ent term." Patents on particular methods of treatment involving the use
of a drug are generally considered less valuable, because they cannot be
used to stop competitors from selling the same product for other uses."
In theory, the patent holder could still enforce the patent against patients
who use the product for the patented use, against doctors who prescribe
it for such use, against pharmacists who fill the prescriptions, or against
manufacturers who urge any of these actors to substitute bioequivalent
products for the patent holder's product in such prescriptions.' 9 But
remedies against customers and intermediaries are generally considered
less satisfactory than an injunction against a competitor that will stop it
from making the product entirely.
20
Despite the advantages of composition of matter patent protection
for new drug products, from the perspective of the pharmaceutical indus-
try, this protection begins and ends too early. Drug development
typically involves the discovery of new compositions long before their
value as drugs is established. Patent law promotes early filing of patent
applications through novelty and statutory bar standards that put dilatory
applicants at risk of losing patent protection entirely.2' Inventors are
well-advised to file patent applications on new compositions of matter as
17. These acts are defined as infringements in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a).
18. See, e.g., Allergan v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For a fuller dis-
cussion of this issue, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 717 (2005).
19. In the examples in the text, the doctors, pharmacists and manufacturers would be
liable for actively inducing direct infringements by the patients themselves. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (b).
20. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is more difficult to detect and prove
an infringing use than it is to detect and prove an infringing product. Second, it is less efficient
to sue numerous users than it is to sue a single manufacturer. Finally, few industries prosper
by suing customers. A rare example of an intellectual property owner seeking to enforce its
rights by suing customers is the Recording Industry Association of America, which has
brought infringement actions against individuals who download copyright-protected music.
See Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-
thepeople.php (last visited July 24, 2006).
21. A patent application is barred under § 102(b) of the Patent Act if the inventor fails
to file within one year of the first publication or other public use of the invention. Moreover,
the dilatory applicant who keeps the invention secret risks losing priority to another applicant
who subsequently claims the same molecule if the dilatory applicant is deemed to have "aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed" the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
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soon as they can establish patentable utility, typically years before the
first commercial marketing of a drug.22 Under current law, 23 patents ex-
pire twenty years after their filing dates, regardless of when they issue.24
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 provides for patent term extensions of
up to five years to compensate for some of the patent life lost during the
FDA approval process, so long as the total remaining patent life after
extensions does not exceed fourteen years from the date of approval.' A
study of drugs approved between 1990 and 1995 showed an average "ef-
fective patent life" between product launch and patent expiration of 11.7
years, with somewhat longer periods appearing toward the end of the
period under study.26 The effective patent life for a new drug, however,
can be far less. For example, the antidepressant drug Paxil did not reach
the market until after the original patent had expired.27
22. An invention must be useful in order to be patented. 35 U.S.C. § 101. This require-
ment may delay the patenting of a new molecule pending discovery of some utility for it. E.g.,
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (holding unpatentable a new method of making a
new steroid where the steroid had not yet been shown to have a practical utility). But modem
cases clarify that the showing of utility necessary to satisfy this requirement of patent law is
far less than the showing of safety and efficacy required by the FDA to bring a new drug to
market. E.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("FDA approval ... is not a
prerequisite for finding a compound useful within the meaning of the patent laws. Usefulness
in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily in-
cludes the expectation of further research and development. The stage at which an invention in
this field becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans.") (citation
omitted).
23. The term of U.S. patent protection was changed in 1995 to bring U.S. law into
compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Properties (TRIPS).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). For U.S. patent applications filed prior to 1995, the applicant
may instead choose a term that begins when the patent is issued and ends seventeen years
later. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1). The seventeen-year term sometimes induced patent applicants to
prosecute their claims lethargically in order to defer issuance and prolong the period of patent
protection after products got to market. Some patent applicants developed this strategy to a
fine art, splitting patent applications into multiple patents and prosecuting them in series to
obtain staggered patent terms. Courts, however, have sometimes been skeptical of the validity
of the later-issued patents resulting from this strategy. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. v. Glaxo
SmithKline, 349 E3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (generic competitor successfully challenged the
validity of later-issued patents deriving from the same parent application as expired patents on
the antibiotic Augmentin on grounds of "double-patenting").
25. The period of extension may include half of the time spent in clinical trials before
submitting a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA, and all of the time that the NDA is
pending before the FDA prior to approval, with provision for adjustment if the applicant did
not act with due diligence. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(l)(B), (g)(6).
26. Henry G. Grabowski and John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals,
19 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98 (2000). Subsequent to the study period, Congress provided for
additional six-month extensions for pediatric studies in the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997.
27. See SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
basic patent on the class of compounds that included the molecule that was ultimately brought
to market under the brand name Paxil® issued on February 8, 1977 with a terminal disclaimer
causing it to expire on October 14, 1992. U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196. A terminal disclaimer is a
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Skeptics of the value of regulation may be tempted to blame regula-
tory lassitude for the long time it takes to bring new drugs to market.
But, although regulatory review will never be instantaneous, FDA review
times have been greatly reduced since the enactment of the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992.8 PDUFA brought the agency new
resources to hire additional staff to expedite the review process, and
made these new resources contingent upon timely reviews. FDA data
from 2003 indicate that almost all NDAs are reviewed within ten months
of their submission dates, with median approval times of 7.5 months for
priority applications and 12.8 months for standard applications.2 9 These
periods account for only a small portion of the patent life used up before
a new drug gets to market.
A far greater source of delay is simply the time it takes-in the labo-
ratory and in clinical trials-for firms to figure out the effects of
patented molecules in patientsi ° This information is an integral part of
the value of new drugs, and a patent term that begins long before this
surrender by the patent applicant of a portion of the patent term, usually to avoid a "double
patenting" rejection of a patent that claims an obvious variation on a previously patented in-
vention. The terminal disclaimer causes the second patent to expire on the same date as the
first, thereby avoiding an extension of the patent term through patenting essentially the same
invention twice. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Smithkline Beecham (SKB)
brought a hemihydrate form of Paxil to market in 1993, following FDA approval of its NDA
on December 29, 1992. Historical information on the approval history of Paxil and other drugs
is available on the FDA website. CDER New and Generic Drug Approvals: 1998-2004,
http:llwww.fda.gov/cderlapproval/index.htm (last visited Aug 2, 2004). SKB obtained a sepa-
rate patent on the hemihydrate form of the molecule, U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723 (issued
January 26, 1988), which was still in effect on the FDA approval date, and SKB selected the
later patent for term extension. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(4) ("in no event shall more than one
patent be extended . .. for the same regulatory review period for any product."). The Federal
Circuit ultimately held this patent invalid, reasoning that the earlier patent application on the
anhydrate for of the molecule inherently disclosed the hemihydrate form, giving rise to a
statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Term extensions are unavailable after patents expire, 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(1), although in-
terim extensions may be obtained if it appears that the regulatory review period will extend
beyond the term of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5).
28. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379). Congress has extended the user fee program twice, first
in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 103,
111 Stat. 2296, 2299-304 (1997), and again in the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of
2002. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, tit. 5,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 501 et seq. (2002).
29. FDA, OVERVIEW OF PDUFA, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/report2003/
overview2003.html.
30. Of course, to the extent that regulators require the collection and submission of this
information, one might still blame regulation for the time lost in testing the effects of drugs.
Whether the value of the information is high enough to justify the delay in product introduc-
tion is an important question that is related to, but distinct from, the question explored in the
text of whether the patent term as a source of exclusive rights is poorly timed to motivate drug
development.
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information is generated is poorly timed to allow patent holders to cap-
ture the value of these information-dependent products.
In recent years drug innovators have sought to prolong their effective
periods of patent protection through various "evergreening" strategies
that add new patents to their quivers as old ones expire.' Examples in-
clude patents on "metabolites" (i.e., the products into which drugs are
transformed in a patient's body);32 patents on intermediate products used
in producing drugs; 33 patents on new uses for drugs;3 and patents on new
formulations or preparations.3 Some innovating firms have succeeded in
getting such patents issued by the PTO, and in using them to defer FDA
approval of generic products for years pending resolution of patent in-
fringement claims.36 The industry's track record in actually winning
37these infringement claims, however, has been considerably worse, sug-
gesting that the combination of patents and FDA regulation is doing
more to protect these patent holders from competition than the patents
could do alone.
Meanwhile, pharmaceutical firms increasingly find themselves tar-
geted with demands to pay for licenses to use the patented inventions of
biotechnology firms and universities. Some biotechnology firms try to
31. See Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues
During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 249-52 (1999); FED. TRADE
COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION" AN FTC STUDY (2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC STUDY].
32. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Novartis
Pharm. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 363 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
33. See, e.g., Ben Venue Labs. v. Novartis Pharm., 10 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 1998).
34. See, e.g., Allergan v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
35. See, e.g., Biovail Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
36. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
37. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(disclosure of drug in patent application more than a year prior to filing of patent application
on metabolite created statutory bar rendering metabolite patent invalid); Glaxo Wellcome v.
Impax Labs., 356 E3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment of noninfringe-
ment of patent on sustained release formulation of bupropion hydrochloride in favor of the
generic competitor that used HPC in lieu of HPMC as specified in claim); Geneva Pharm. v.
GlaxoSmithKline, 349 F.3d 1373 (2003) (holding invalid on grounds of nonstatutory double
patenting subsequently issued patents related to the antibiotic on which previously issued
patents had expired); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ex-
pired patent on active ingredient in ClaritinTM, which issued more than a year before earliest
priority date for patent in suit on metabolite, rendered later patent invalid under doctrine of
inherent anticipation). In a telling sign of judicial skepticism toward pharmaceutical ever-
greening patents, in some cases different judges have offered markedly different explanations
for why the patent owner should lose, agreeing only on the outcome. Compare SmithKline
Beecham v. Apotex Corp., 403 E3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (opinion of Rader, J., holding patent
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)) with id. at 1347 (opinion of Gajarsa, J., holding patent inva-
lid under 35 U.S.C. § 101) and SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d
1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (opinion of Posner, J., sitting by designation, holding patent valid but not
infringed).
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stake out market niches "upstream" of drug development, using patents
as leverage to get pharmaceutical firms to partner with them to use their
proprietary research platforms to develop new products. Universities
have also become increasingly aggressive patent holders in the last 25
years, since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980" encouraged them to
patent discoveries made with federal funds.39 A large percentage of uni-
versity patenting activity is in biomedical research,4° and universities
have not hesitated to enforce their patents against pharmaceutical firms.'
One way or another, most of these new patent-seekers are pursuing a
piece of the action in the profitable business of drug development. They
thus contribute to the costs of drug development as well as to its profits.
Patents on drugs make drug development profitable by providing
patent owners with exclusivity in the market for new pharmaceutical
products, but patents on drugs are not the only patents that arise along
the road to the pharmaceutical marketplace. Patents cover inventions,
and inventions do not necessarily correspond to product markets. Many
inventions feed into drug development, including research platform
technologies like genomic information and databases, newly identified
38. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)).
39. Universities owned 1.4% of all non-Federally owned U.S. patents issued between
1969 and 1989; by 1999 that number had risen to 4.8%. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT GRANTS 1969-2003, available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/asgn/tableI .htm.
40. See David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Uni-
versities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y. 99, 117
(2001) (noting that leading patents at the University of California, Stanford, and Columbia
"are concentrated in the biomedical area."); see also Annetine C. Geljins & Samuel 0. Thier,
Medical Innovation and Institutional Interdependence: Rethinking University-Industry Con-
nections, 287 JAMA 72, 75 (2002) (observing that the medical center at Columbia accounts
for nearly 85% of the University's licensed inventions); DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY
TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BE-
FORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (2004).
41. For example, the University of Rochester's federally-funded research on the Cox-2
enzyme, which plays an important role in the inflammation process, yielded a patent that
claimed inhibitors of this enzyme. The university brought patent infringement actions against
pharmaceutical companies that made Cox-2 inhibitors, including such once lucrative products
as Vioxx (Merck) and Celebrex (Pfizer). See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F.
Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g & reh'g en banc
denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The University of California's $200 million settlement
with Genentech, M. Barinaga, Genentech, UC Settle Suit for $200 Million, 286 SCIENCE 1655
(1999), and the University of Minnesota's $300 million settlement with Glaxo-Wellcome, The
U Has Settled a Year Old Lawsuit, 29 UNIV. OF MINN. BRIEF, Oct. 13, 1999, available at
http:llwwwl.umn.edu/urelate/brief/1999-10-13.html, have emboldened others to follow with
their own lawsuits, including Baylor College of Medicine, Cornell University, Columbia Uni-
versity, University of Rochester and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See Margaret
C. Fisk, Ivory Towers Fire Back Over Patents: More Schools Are Suing Businesses, NAT'L
LAW J., Aug. 26, 2002, atAl.
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(or characterized) drug targets, genetically engineered animal models,
and new laboratory techniques, instruments, and reagents. These "up-
stream" inventions, which help to explain disease pathways and
mechanisms and to identify potential targets for therapeutic interven-
tions, are increasingly likely to be patented, and patents on these
numerous discoveries impose costs on drug development.42 From the
perspective of a drug-developing firm, these new patents are so many
siphons at the feeding trough of the next pharmaceutical blockbuster,
draining away profits in many different directions.
In sum, although the party line of the pharmaceutical industry con-
tinues to endorse strong patent protection throughout the world, firms
must recognize that the patent system has become a mixed blessing for
their bottom lines, adding to costs as well as profits. Moreover, as the
science of drug development becomes more complex, as time to market
from discovery of a new molecule grows longer and more uncertain, and
as the courts grow more skeptical of evergreening strategies, patents can
not always be counted upon to secure effective market exclusivity for
drug developing firms beyond that provided by the FDA.
II. FDA REGULATION: PROFITS AS WELL AS COSTS
FDA regulation does much to support the profitability of drug devel-
opment even as it adds to its costs. Like other costly regulatory regimes,
FDA regulation serves as a barrier to entry that protects market incum-
bents from competition from new firms. The size of this particular entry
barrier is not merely an inadvertent artifact of regulations that aim to
protect health and safety. Instead, it has been carefully calibrated in leg-
islative compromises that balance the interests of pioneering drug
developers against those of consumers and generic competitors.
The most important of these legislative compromises is the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly
known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act."43 Prior to passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the hurdle of FDA approval was high enough to keep ge-
neric equivalents of most drugs off the market long after the drugs went
42. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools:
Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (R. Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2001).
43. Act of Sept. 24, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc; 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and 35 U.S.C.
§§ 155, 155A, 156, 271, and 282). See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for
Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal
History of U.S. Law and Observations for the Future, 39 IDEA 389 (1999).
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off patent. The FDA took the position that generic versions of previously
approved drugs were themselves "new drugs" requiring proof of safety
and efficacy before they could be brought to market.' At the same time,
the FDA treated clinical trial data submitted to the agency by pioneer
firms as proprietary information belonging to the submitter, which the
agency would not disclose or permit others to rely upon in their applica-
tions.45 Moreover, generic drug companies could not conduct their own
clinical trials until after patents on the drugs expired without exposing
themselves to infringement liability. 6 Even after patent expiration, ge-
neric firms faced prohibitive regulatory costs that they could not recoup
in the low-margin, competitive market for off-patent drugs. Generic
firms argued that the regulatory entry barrier had to be lowered for ge-
neric products in order to bring about price competition in the market for
off-patent drugs.47 Manufacturers of pioneer drugs argued that it was
only fair that FDA regulation of generic products should delay generic
entry beyond patent expiration, since FDA regulation typically consumed
years of the patent terms for pioneer drugs .
Congress responded to these competing criticisms of the status quo
with a package of measures that blurred the functional distinction be-
tween drug regulation and patents. For generic manufacturers, the Hatch-
Waxman Act provided a streamlined process for obtaining FDA approval
to sell a product that is "bioequivalent" to a previously approved product
through use of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA),49 and per-
mitted the necessary clinical trials to proceed during the patent term
without infringement liability.0 For research pharmaceutical firms, the
Hatch-Waxman Act directed PTO to grant patent term extensions of up
to five years to compensate for marketing delays during the regulatory
44. Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal of the Policy Described in the Agency's
"Paper" NDA Memorandum of July 31, 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 82052 (Dec. 12, 1980). See gen-
erally Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1792-93 (1996) and sources cited therein. A limited exception permitted the
introduction of generic versions of products that had been on the market since before 1962 on
the basis of abbreviated applications.
45. Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602 (Dec. 24, 1974).
46. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
47. Generic versions of previously approved products were sometimes approved on the
basis of "paper NDAs," which relied upon published data concerning the safety and efficacy
of the previously approved drug to obtain approval for a bioequivalent product, but such data
were not always available. See Engelberg, supra note 43, at 396-97. The Hatch-Waxman Act
authorized continued use of paper NDAs in a provision codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).
48. For a history of the Hatch-Waxman Act from the perspective of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, see Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition
and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, 40 Food DRUG CosM. L.J. 269 (1985).
49. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 5050); 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).
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review period prior to the first permitted commercial marketing of a new
drug.' At the same time, it set up a complex system for keeping track of
patents that cover FDA-approved drugs and directed the FDA to defer
regulatory approval of generic versions of those drugs until after patent
expiration. In this system, competing manufacturers who believe that
their products do not infringe these patents, or that the patents are inva-
lid, can file ANDAs prior to patent expiration. If the patent owner files
an infringement action within 45 days, however, FDA approval of the
ANDA is stayed for 30 months. This stay takes effect regardless of the
underlying merits of the legal arguments (except in the unlikely event
that a court resolves the issue sooner).53 In effect, this 30-month stay of
regulatory approval is like a preliminary injunction in favor of a patent
holder, administered by FDA rather than by a trial court, and with no
requirement to show likelihood of success on the merits.4
51. 35 U.S.C. § 156. See supra note 25.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (c), (j).
53. Holders of approved new drug applications (NDAs) are required to disclose all
patents that they believe would be infringed by unauthorized sales of the approved drug, and
the FDA publishes the list in a publication called the Orange Book. Firms soon recognized
that it made sense for them to list expansively any relevant patents, including, for example,
patents covering aspects of the product formulation that are easy to design around to avoid
infringement. Such an expansive approach preserved opportunities to file multiple lawsuits
that triggered multiple 30-month stays of FDA approval, in effect, prolonging the period of
profitable market exclusivity beyond what the listed patents (which could be invalid or not
infringed, or at least not so clearly valid and infringed as to justify a preliminary injunction)
could do on their own. See FTC STUDY, supra note 31. For a particularly egregious example
of this strategy, see Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that
Hatch-Waxman Act does not require the FDA to review patents for validity and infringement
before listing them).
54. In 2002, the Bush administration announced a plan to limit patent holders to a sin-
gle 30-month stay per product by FDA rule. See FDA, Application for FDA Approval to
Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements and Application of 30-month Stays on Ap-
proval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is
Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed (proposed Sept. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
314), http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/PATENT.pdf [hereinafter "Patent Listing
Requirements"]. The FTC had previously proposed such a rule. FTC STUDY, supra note 31, at
ii. According to the Congressional testimony of Lester Crawford, then Deputy Commissioner
of Food and Drugs, 17 out of 442 active ANDAs that involve patent challenges have had mul-
tiple 30-month stays, including a significant number of products with high dollar value annual
sales. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, H.R. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Lester M. Crawford, Deputy Comm'r of Food and Drugs), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2002/hatchwaxmanl009.html. The final rule is set forth at 68
Fed. Reg. 36676 (June 18, 2003).
Somewhat different limitations on the availability of 30-month stays were codified as
part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. Pub. L.
No. 108-173 § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550)). That
act provides that for ANDAs filed after August 18, 2003, a 30-month stay is available only for
litigation involving patents submitted to the FDA prior to the date that the ANDA was submit-
ted. Id. § I l01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), (b)(2)(B)(i) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii),
(c)(3)(C)).
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In this new regime, it is difficult to tell just how much work is being
done by patents and how much by drug regulation in deferring generic
entry. Congress has sought to synchronize and calibrate the entry barri-
ers posed by the two legal regimes. The FDA is pervasively called upon
to track patents in administering its system of drug approvals, although
without ever making substantive judgments about patent validity and
infringement. At the same time, the PTO is called upon to track the FDA
approval process in timing the expiration of patents. The two systems
operate in tandem to confer exclusivity in markets for new products and
to determine when that exclusivity should end, blurring the line between
concerns about health and safety and efforts to reward innovation.
III. FDA-ADMINISTERED PSEUDO-PATENTS
Other legislative initiatives have cast the FDA in the role of adminis-
tering pharmaceutical pseudo-patents, unabashedly directing the FDA to
use its market gatekeeper role to provide firms with market exclusivity in
exchange for investing in certain kinds of pharmaceutical R&D. An early
example of this is the Orphan Drug Act of 1983,-' which directs the
agency to grant seven years of market exclusivity for products to treat
rare diseases and conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 patients in the
United States.56 Although one might expect that products qualifying for
this protection would have markets too small to be lucrative, in fact,
many products qualifying for exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act
have had large and profitable markets for off-label use.5 7 The effect of
FDA-administered market exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act is
similar to the effect of a patent on a particular use of a drug."
In 1984 Congress added two more provisions for FDA-administered
market exclusivity in the Hatch-Waxman Act, providing five years of
market exclusivity for new chemical entities not previously approved by
55. Pub. L. No. 97-414,96 Stat. 2049.
56. Under § 527 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, if the FDA approves a
new drug application for a drug that it has designated for a rare disease or condition, "the
Secretary may not approve another application.., for such drug for such disease or condition
for a person who is not the holder of such approved application ... until the expiration of
seven years from the date of the approval of the approved application . 21 U.S.C.
§ 360cc(a).
57. "Off-label" use of a drug means use for a purpose other than that for which the FDA
has approved the drug as safe and effective.
58. The exclusivity conferred by the Orphan Drug Act is limited to a prohibition against
approval of another application "for such drug for such disease or condition," and thus does
not preclude approval of either (1) another drug for the same disease or condition, or (2) the
same drug for another disease or condition. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301
(D.D.C. 1987); Sigma-Tau Pharms. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2002).
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the FDA, 9 and three years of exclusivity for making changes in a previ-
ously approved product that required conducting new clinical trials to
win FDA approval.60 In contrast to the Orphan Drug Act provisions, these
Hatch-Waxman Act exclusivity provisions merely prevent the FDA from
allowing competitors to obtain a streamlined review of their applications
without having to submit a full NDA. They do not prevent a competitor
from obtaining approval if it is willing to go to the trouble and expense
of conducting its own clinical trials and to rely strictly on its own data
for proof of safety and efficacy. In effect, these provisions amount to
FDA-administered proprietary rights in regulatory data, awarded to en-
courage particular kinds of innovation in drug development rather than
to protect consumers from unsafe or ineffective drugs. The practical ef-
fect is to defer generic competition, even without patent protection.
The five-year period of data exclusivity for a new chemical entity
begins with first market approval and therefore often runs concurrently
with patent protection, although in some cases it may last longer.6' The
three-year period of data exclusivity for making product changes that
require clinical trials to gain approval begins with the approval of the
supplemental application, making it more amenable to strategic manipu-
lation to prolong market exclusivity. For example, as a product
approaches the end of its patent life, a firm might seek approval to
switch the product from prescription to over-the-counter sales, after
testing the product in patients to determine if they may safely self-
administer it without the supervision of a physician.62 The data exclusiv-
ity thereby gained is limited to the terms of the new approval, and will
not prevent a competitor from using an ANDA to sell the product as pre-
viously approved, or for previously approved indications.
This has proven to be a very significant limitation on the use of a
supplemental NDA to gain approval to market a drug for a new indica-
tion.6' The three-year exclusivity does not preclude a generic competitor
from getting approval to sell its version of the product for the original
indication, and once the generic version is available on the market, the
FDA can do nothing to stop physicians from prescribing the generic
59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii). This latter source of exclusivity might be available, for
example, to a manufacturer that makes a change in the dosage form for a product, or that seeks
approval of a drug for a new indication, or conducts clinical trials to determine whether a drug
may safely be switched from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC) status.
61. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Paxil).
62. The strategic considerations behind the timing of these moves are laid bare in stud-
ies by consulting firms that are posted on the internet. See, e.g., Kline & Co., Impending Wave
of Rx-to-OTC Switches Offers Significant Opportunities for Drug Companies, Aug. 15, 2002,
http://www.klinegroup.com/news/6_2002815.asp.
63. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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product off-label for the new indication. Indeed, unless the new indica-
tion involves a different formulation of the product, state generic
substitution laws may pressure the original innovator to lower its prices
to avoid generic substitution at the point of filling the prescription.64
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
added a provision for six months of exclusivity as a reward for conduct-
ing pediatric trials of drugs.6' This six-month period of exclusivity is not
contingent upon approval of the drug as safe and effective in children
and is not limited to pediatric use of the drug. It simply extends any ex-
isting market exclusivity held by the submitter, whether under a patent,
the Orphan Drug Act, or Hatch-Waxman exclusivity provisions,' further
deferring the time when FDA might approve a competing generic prod-
uct.
Each of these provisions confers patent-like protection under the
auspices of the FDA rather than the PTO. Although the resulting protec-
tion is often linked to submission and consideration of data from clinical
trials of drugs for safety and efficacy, each of these exclusivity provi-
sions may be better understood as an economic measure designed to
promote costly investments in innovation than as a consumer protection
measure designed to keep unsafe or ineffective products off the market.
In each case, FDA regulation serves a function traditionally relegated to
the patent system: promoting and rewarding investments in innovation
by granting valuable exclusionary rights.67
64. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 43 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 49-56 (1979).
65. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296. Although this provision was originally set to
expire after five years, it has been extended. See Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of
2002, P.L. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (codified as amended in scattered provisions of Titles 21
and 42 of U.S.C.).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 355a.
67. Another controversial Hatch-Waxman Act provision that has the effect of using the
FDA to prolong the period of exclusivity in product markets is the provision of a 180-day
period of exclusivity to the first generic applicant to file a patent challenge against any ap-
proved drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see FTC STUDY, supra note 31, at 57-63. Designed
to spur generic competition with products covered by questionable patents, the provision had
the unintended effect of providing a strategic opportunity to defer generic competition in
products that patent law would otherwise leave unprotected. The first challenger and the patent
owner would reach a litigation settlement that affirmed the validity and infringement of the
questionable patent, deferring the effective date of any subsequently filed ANDA for the same
drug indefinitely while rendering subsequent challengers ineligible for the 180-day exclusiv-
ity. The FTC challenged this strategy under the antitrust laws, id. at 1-2, and Congress moved to
curtail these strategies as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modemiza-
tion Act of 2003 by defining certain "forfeiture events" that would cause the first generic
applicant to lose its right to generic exclusivity. Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2458
(codified in pertinent part at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)). But insofar as this exclusivity is still
available, it is another example of how the combination of patents and drug-specific regulation
provides longer exclusivity than the patent system could do on its own.
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Another important role played by the FDA in supplementing the ex-
clusivity provided by patents is protecting patent holders against parallel
imports of drugs previously sold at a lower price in another country.
Since drugs are more expensive in the United States than anywhere else
in the world, 6' the profits from sales in the United States are potentially
vulnerable to erosion through arbitrage that moves drugs from low-price
(foreign) to high-price (domestic) markets.69
The legal status of this arbitrage under the patent laws is not entirely
clear. Under the "first sale" doctrine, the sale of a patented article by or
with the permission of the owner exhausts the patent monopoly with re-
spect to that article. 70 This doctrine plainly permits buyers to resell in the
U.S. secondary market any goods (such as used cars) that were pur-
chased in the United States without having to get renewed permission
from the owners of the patents on the goods and their various compo-
nents. It is less clear whether it permits importers of patented drugs from
Canada, for example, to resell them in the United States.
This is a point on which the national patent laws of different coun-
tries are in disagreement. Some countries follow a rule of "national
exhaustion," which means that the first sale doctrine only permits resales
within the same country, while others follow a rule of "international ex-
haustion," which means that once the patent holder has authorized sale
of a patented article anywhere in the world, the purchaser is free to resell
it anywhere without needing further permission. This issue has generated
considerable debate in trade negotiations, but so far there has been no
agreement and each nation is free to choose its own exhaustion rule.7'
The U.S. bargaining position in trade negotiations, supported by the
pharmaceutical industry, has favored imposition by treaty of a uniform
rule of national exhaustion." But it is not entirely clear that this is cur-
rently the law in the United States. 73 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
68. See Judith L. Wagner & Elizabeth McCarthy, International Differences in Drug
Prices, 25 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 475 (2004).
69. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceu-
tical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185 (1999).
70. See Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
71. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 5, sec.
1(a), art. 6, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-elt-agmO-e.htm [hereinafter "TRIPS
Agreement"].
72. DANIEL GERVAiS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
112-15 (2d ed. 2005).
73. For a careful analysis of this question prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in Jazz
Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), see Margreth
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Federal Circuit once observed in passing, with no acknowledgment of
controversy, that under U.S. patent law the first sale doctrine only ap-
plies if there has been a sale in the United States.74 But the U.S. Supreme
Court has arguably held otherwise in the copyright context, at least if the
goods were manufactured in the United States,5 and in the trademark
context, at least if the goods come from a company that is owned by or
affiliated with the U.S. mark owner.1
6
Despite the uncertain coverage of U.S. patent law, FDA regulation
protects patent owners against parallel imports of drugs. This protection
arises in part from differences in labeling requirements for drugs sold in
different markets.77 But the pharmaceutical industry does not rely on
these regulatory differences to protect it from parallel trade in drugs in
the United States. Congress fortified protection against parallel imports
by enacting the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, which specifi-
cally prohibits reimportation of previously exported U.S.-manufactured
drugs except by the manufacturer, unless required for emergency medi-
cal care. There is a genuine health and safety issue lurking behind these
provisions,79 but they also have an economic side effect that may be even
more important-preserving the viability of price discrimination across
national markets for drugs. This economic side effect has brought re-
newed political attention to the prohibition against reimportation, as
legislators, insurers, and entrepreneurs have sought to give U.S. consum-
ers the benefit of cheaper drug prices in Canada and other countries.8
Barrett, The United States' Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of Patented Goods, 27 N.
Ky. L. REV. 911 (2000).
74. Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d 1094 ("United States patent rights are not exhausted by prod-
ucts of foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of the first sale doctrine, the authorized
first sale must have occurred under the United States patent.").
75. Quality King Distribs. v. L'anza Research Int'l, 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
76. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
77. FDA approval to market a new drug is contingent upon the inclusion of specified
information in the accompanying label about indications, dosage, side effects, etc. In an inter-
esting counterpoint to the push toward harmonization of national regulations to promote free
trade, the most enduring obstacle to parallel trade in drugs may prove to be national differ-
ences in drug regulation that make products manufactured for one market difficult to sell
elsewhere. In this respect, differences in national laws operate to the advantage of the pharma-
ceutical industry, while harmonization efforts loom as a long-term threat to profits.
78. Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 331,
333, 353, 381, & 801(d).
79. See Press Release, FDA, FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams Reveal Hundreds
of Potentially Dangerous Imported Drug Shipments (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00948.html.
80. See, e.g., Vermont v. Leavitt, 405 F Supp. 2d 466 (D. Vt. 2005). The ultimate political
resolution of this issue remains uncertain. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1121-23, 117 Stat. 2066, 2464. For a liber-
tarian argument that markets should be permitted to equalize the prices charged for drugs in
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Meanwhile, the federal government, invoking health and safety con-
cerns, has taken the lead in prosecuting reimporters of drugs from
Canada,8' thereby relieving pharmaceutical firms of the burden of enforc-
ing their own economic interests against defendants who present
themselves as champions of access to affordable drugs.
In sum, FDA regulation is an important source of protection for
drug-developing firms against competition from free riders and thereby
enhances the profitability of drug development. This protection is in part
a side effect of regulatory moves that can be justified entirely in terms of
protecting health and safety. But at times it is more overtly about moti-
vating firms to invest in particular types of R&D, such as developing
orphan drugs, bringing new chemical entities to market, and conducting
further clinical trials of previously approved products.
IV. FDA PSEUDO-PATENTS VS. PATENTS
To the extent that legal regulation deliberately provides protection
against competition in product markets as an economic incentive for
R&D, one might ask whether it makes sense to provide such protection
through FDA-administered rules rather than through patent law. Eco-
nomic incentives for R&D are traditionally the province of the patent
system, and arguably outside the core competence of the FDA in protect-
ing public health8 2 Nonetheless, there are advantages to using FDA
regulation as a mechanism for providing product exclusivity.
The patent system is a one-size-fits-all legal regime that applies es-
sentially the same rules to inventions arising in biopharmaceutical
research, automotive engineering, information technology, semiconduc-
tors, rocket science, and even business methods. But the needs of these
fields for patent protection differ greatly, making it difficult to fine-tune
the patent laws to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry without
upsetting the balance of protection and competition in other industries.
U.S. patent law has some industry-specific provisions, including the
Hatch-Waxman patent term extension provisions,83 biotechnology proc-
different countries, see Roger Pilon, Drug Reimportation: The Free Market Solution, 2004 CATO
INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS No. 521, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa521 .pdf.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
82. The unease of the FDA in this relatively new role is perhaps reflected in its reluc-
tance to evaluate whether the patents designated by pharmaceutical firms for listing in the
Orange Book are appropriately listed or not, and in its reluctance to consider whether there is
any plausible basis for asserting that a generic product will infringe such patents before enter-
ing a 30-month stay of regulatory approval for the generic product. See Abbreviated New
Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50345
(Oct. 3, 1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 156.
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ess patent provisions,8 and prior user rights for business method pat-
ents."' Often the result of legislative compromise after a change proposed
by one industry meets opposition from another, these provisions are
awkward, cumbersome, and are more likely to address the interests of
well-heeled rent-seekers than to preserve the public interest.
Industry-specific patent provisions may also place the United States
in violation of the TRIPS agreement, which requires signatories to pro-
vide patent protection "without discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or
locally produced."86 The prohibition on discrimination in patent protec-
tion by field of technology was much favored by the pharmaceutical
industry in the course of trade negotiations in order to force member
states to eliminate provisions in their national laws that previously weak-
ened drug patents (such as compulsory licensing provisions)."' But the
treaty language is written in broader terms that seem also to prohibit dis-
crimination in favor of drug patents as well as against them.
FDA-administered exclusivity may be a way around these legal and
political problems. To the extent that the exclusivity needs of the phar-
maceutical industry are different from those of other industries, it might
be less problematic to fine tune the drug regulation rules than it is to fine
tune the patent system. If it is too obvious that this is what is really going
on, the WTO might decide-perhaps in response to a complaint from a
nation with an aggrieved generic drug industry such as India or Israel-
that so-called FDA exclusivity is really a patent by another name, and
that industry-specific pseudo-patents violate treaty obligations regardless
of where the exclusionary rights are located in the U.S. Code. Still, it
might be easier to finesse the issue if the protection arises through drug
regulation, particularly if the underlying legislation serves a significant
interest other than intellectual property, such as the protection of health
and safety.
Apart from legal and political constraints on fortifying patent protec-
tion for biopharmaceutical inventions, there are at least two reasons why
the pharmaceutical industry might prefer FDA-administered exclusivity
to stronger patent protection.
First, the FDA provides product market exclusivity while the patent
system provides invention exclusivity. Because many inventions are used
in the course of product development, strengthening patent protection is
84. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 273.
86. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 71, at art. 27 (emphasis added).
87. See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive
to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069 (1996).
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a double-edged sword for innovating firms. While it fortifies the drug
patents that provide product market exclusivity, it also fortifies the pat-
ents on the many proprietary inputs into drug development, thus adding
to the costs as well as the revenues for drug-developing firms. FDA-
administered exclusivities, by contrast, enhance product revenues with-
out increasing these costs. Second, FDA-administered exclusivities
typically run while a product is on the market, while much or all of a
patent term may run earlier than that. As a result, it may be easier for
firms to time the period of FDA-administered exclusivity strategically so
as to maximize profits.
On the other hand, the relative ease of changing the rules governing
FDA-administered exclusivities makes them more vulnerable than pat-
ents to legislative and administrative change in response to shifting
political currents. In a political environment that reflects more concern
about controlling the rising costs of drugs than about fortifying incen-
tives for new drug development, it may be harder for drug-developing
firms to sustain FDA-administered measures that currently support high
drug prices than it is to sustain the rights conferred by the patent sys-
tem.,,
It is politically and legally difficult to change the patent system, par-
ticularly in the post-TRIPS era, but there are many levers to push in the
drug regulation system to chip away at the market exclusivity that sup-
ports current drug prices. Entry barriers achieved through FDA
regulation might thus prove less durable than those conferred by patents.
V. FDA CONTROL OF CLINICAL TRIALS AS INNOVATION POLICY
More central to the health and safety mission of the FDA than the
various provisions for securing market exclusivity to drug developers are
(1) its role in approving (or disapproving) the marketing of new drugs89
based on clinical evidence of safety and efficacy 9° and (2) its role in lim-
iting promotional claims that manufacturers make about products under
88. For example, even the Bush administration, which has enjoyed strong support from
the pharmaceutical industry and has been generally quite receptive to its interests, bowed to
political pressure to facilitate generic entry by changing FDA rules to limit the kinds of patents
that qualify for the prolonged exclusivity benefits of the Hatch-Waxman Act and to permit
patent holders only one automatic 30-month stay of generic approval per product pending the
resolution of infringement litigation. See Patent Listing Requirements, supra note 54. This
change in policy was initially a result of executive action alone, without the need for new
legislation, although Congress promptly followed by codifying similar restrictions as part of
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. Pub. L. No.
108-173 § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-57 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 3550)).
89. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(a).
90. Id. § 505(b).
The Role of the FDA
its authority to protect the public from products that are "misbranded."9'
In performing these core functions, the FDA seems to be protecting pa-
tients rather than rewarding innovation, thereby adding to the costs of
drug development and limiting its rewards. Yet even in these core roles,
the agency's original function of protecting the public from snake oil has
become pervasively intertwined with its more modem function of getting
firms to conduct rigorous clinical trials of drugs.92
Popular perceptions of the value of these regulatory roles have
shifted over time. For much of the history of the FDA, Congress and the
courts were broadly supportive of the agency's conservative stance to-
ward protecting the public from products that might be hazardous,
useless, or both. In the past quarter century, attitudes toward the FDA
have become more mixed. Today, rather than getting praised as a cau-
tious steward of public health, the FDA is often criticized as a
paternalistic bureaucracy interposing costly barriers between patients
who demand new products and firms that are eager to supply them.93 In
this changed political environment, the traditional role of the FDA is be-
ing reappraised, making it especially important to understand what work
FDA regulation actually does.
Justifications for the FDA's roles that focus on protecting patients
from harm invite the objection that patients may be harmed by disease as
well as by drugs. Such justifications have become less persuasive as
patient advocacy groups and drug developing firms have forged political
alliances to streamline the regulatory process. In the early days of the
AIDS epidemic many patients argued forcefully that they would rather
take the risks posed by investigational drugs that did not have FDA
91. Id. §§ 301,502.
92. Both functions are apparent in the current statutory language, which retains the
indignant early 20th century vocabulary of prior legislative enactments to characterize prod-
ucts that do not meet the standards ("adulterated" and "misbranded") while using the
technocratic vernacular of scientific peer review to characterize the standards themselves
("adequate and well-controlled investigations ... by experts qualified by scientific training
and experience"). More specifically, Section 505(d) provides that the Agency may refuse to
approve an application if the investigations that the sponsor submits "do not include adequate
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use
under the conditions in the proposed labeling," or if there is a lack of "substantial evidence"
that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of
the proposed labeling, defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence consisting of adequate and
well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scien-
tific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of
which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the
effect it purports or is represented to .... Id. § 505(d).
93. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that denying terminally ill patients access to "potentially life-saving medication" not yet
approved by the FDA for use outside clinical trials impinges upon an interest protected by due
process), vacated, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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approval than allow their illnesses to progress pending the results of
definitive clinical trials.94 It is difficult to make the case for imposing
costly and time-consuming regulation as a way of protecting terminally
ill patients from risks that they are eager (and impatient) to encounter.
The harshness of withholding potentially life-saving drugs from ter-
minally ill patients clearly troubled the panel majority in the recent
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach.9 The Abigail Alliance, a patient ad-
vocacy group, sought access on behalf of terminally ill patients to
investigational new drugs that had performed well in preliminary "Phase
I" trials in a small number of patients and were therefore approved for
testing in "Phase II" trials in a larger group of patients. The court held
that the FDA's policy of denying such access impinged upon substantive
due process rights to privacy, liberty and life, suggesting that the FDA
was equivalent to a common law tortfeasor who was interfering with
efforts to rescue an injured person:
A right of control over one's body has deep roots in the common
law.... As recognized throughout Anglo-American history and
law, when a person is faced with death, necessity often warrants
extraordinary measures not otherwise justified. Indeed, the prin-
ciple holds even when that action impinges upon the rights of
others.... Barring a terminally ill patient from the use of a po-
tentially life-saving treatment impinges on this right of self-
preservation.
Such a bar also puts the FDA in the position of interfering with
efforts that could save a terminally ill patient's life. Although the
common law imposes no general duty to rescue or to preserve a
life, it does create liability for interfering with such efforts.96
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
FDA's policy is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.
The FDA's protective approach toward the risks posed by drugs
seems anomalous when patients enjoy relatively unfettered access to po-
tentially lethal dietary supplements.97 From a consumer protection
94. See STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE (1996).
95. 445 F.3d 470, vacated, 469 F3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
96. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
97. In the case of dietary supplements, such as ephedra, the burden of proof is on the
FDA to establish that the product poses an unreasonable risk before it may be removed from
the market. 21 U.S.C. § 342(0(1). After years of regulatory maneuvering, the FDA banned the
sale of ephedrine alkaloids after declaring that such products are "adulterated" and present an
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perspective, it is difficult to make sense of a two-tiered regulatory system
that subjects ethical pharmaceutical products to rigorous scientific stan-
dards for proof of safety and efficacy before they reach the market, while
allowing substantially untested and unregulated dietary supplements,
which purport to have similar effects and pose unknown hazards, to stay
on the market until the FDA establishes that they are unreasonably dan-
gerous.
Of course, one might argue that the way to correct the asymmetry is
to eliminate the exemptions that currently allow untested dietary sup-
plements and nutriceuticals to remain on the market. But plainly some
consumers (including some members of Congress) want these products
and do not want the FDA to regulate them, and the consumers and manu-
facturers of these products have so far succeeded in persuading Congress
to keep the FDA off their backs.98 The existence of a relatively unregu-
lated dietary supplement market alongside a highly regulated
pharmaceuticals market nonetheless poses a challenge to a justification
for regulation that rests solely on safety and consumer protection. Why
keep drugs off the market until their manufacturers prove that they are
safe and effective, while allowing dietary supplements to stay on the
market until regulators prove that they are unreasonably dangerous?
Another anomalous aspect of the current regulatory regime from a
pure consumer protection perspective is the approach to off-label use of
products that the FDA has approved for only a narrow set of adequately
tested indications. Once the FDA has approved a product for a single
indication in a particular group of patients, physicians are free to pre-
scribe it for any patient and for any indication, notwithstanding the
absence of any clinical trial data to establish the safety and efficacy of
the drug beyond the approved use. 99 Off-label prescription of drugs is a
unreasonable risk of illness or injury. Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine
Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6787 (Feb.
11, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 119). Manufacturers have unsuccessfully challenged this
regulation in the courts. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 459 F3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2006);
NVE, Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the
FDA's factual and legal determinations in its rule banning ephedrine alkaloid are entitled to
deference under the Administrative Procedure Act, and that judicial review is limited to the
administrative record). The burden on the FDA to prove that a dietary supplement such as
ephedra is adulterated before removing it from the market stands in marked contrast to the
burden on applicants for approval of a new drug to demonstrate safety and efficacy in order to
bring new pharmaceutical products to market in the first place.
98. E.g., Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417,
108 Stat. 4325 (limiting the FDA's power to regulate dietary supplements as either food addi-
tives or new drugs).
99. See Request for Comments on FDA's Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of
Approved Drugs and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18, 1994); Proposed New
Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Products Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, 26,733 (June
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significant part of medical practice in some specialties, notably including
oncology. Yet the FDA sharply curtails (insofar as the courts will per-
mit) '°° manufacturers' efforts to disseminate information to physicians
about off-label uses of drugs. If off-label uses of drugs threaten patient
safety, then why permit them? On the other hand, if off-label uses do not
threaten patient safety enough to prohibit them, then why not promote,
rather than prohibit, the dissemination of any information about these
uses that will help physicians make better choices for their patients?
These boundaries of FDA regulation, although puzzling from a con-
sumer protection perspective, make considerably more sense from the
perspective of promoting investment in drug trials. The FDA uses its
powers as a market gatekeeper and as a censor of marketing claims not
just to protect patients from untoward risks of harm, but also to motivate
drug sponsors to generate valuable information about their drugs. The
clinical trials that are necessary to generate this information are costly,
time-consuming, and risky. The information that they provide is valu-
able, but trial sponsors are unable to capture much of that value. In fact,
trial sponsors stand to lose revenue if trials indicate that their products
are unsafe or ineffective for certain indications. Indeed, from the per-
spective of the manufacturer, rigorous clinical trials of off-label uses
may be as likely to diminish the value of a particular product as to en-
hance it.'"' How to motivate firms to invest in generating this information
in an honest, scientifically sound fashion is a major challenge for the
law. By requiring that firms conduct rigorous clinical trials before bring-
ing their products to market and before making promotional claims for
their products, the FDA plays an important structural role in promoting a
valuable form of biomedical R&D that private firms are undermotivated
to perform on their own, while internalizing the costs of this R&D to the
firms. By providing a system of independent expert scrutiny of the re-
sulting data and certifying the safety and efficacy of tested products for
particular indications, the FDA preserves public confidence in the integ-
9, 1983); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 705-07 (N.D. Cal.
1975), aff'd 532 F.2d 708, 714-17 (9th Cir. 1976).
100. The courts in recent years have invalidated regulatory and statutory restrictions on
the promotion of pharmaceutical products on First Amendment grounds. See Washington
Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998); Washington Legal Found. v.
Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357
(2002).
101. A recent case in point is Vioxx, a product that had been approved by the FDA for
treatment of pain and inflammation associated with osteoarthritis, menstruation, and rheuma-
toid arthritis and was generating sales in excess of $2 billion per year before it was taken off
the market by its sponsor, Merck. Merck undertook additional clinical trials in the hope of
getting FDA approval to market Vioxx for prevention of recurrent colonic polyps. See Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Learning the Value of Drugs-Is Rofecoxib a Regulatory Success Story?, 352
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1285 (2005).
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rity of the results while preserving them as proprietary information of
the sponsor. Otherwise anomalous aspects of FDA regulation of new
drug applications and promotional claims may be better understood as a
response to this challenge than as a means of protecting consumers from
purveyors of snake oil.
The control mechanisms that the FDA uses-setting barriers to
bringing new products to market and limiting permissible promotional
claims-make more sense as a way of motivating firms to conduct rigor-
ous trials than as a way of protecting patients from risks of harm. After
all, many patients already face substantial risks of harm from their dis-
eases. By withholding new drugs from the market and blocking the
dissemination to doctors of preliminary information about new uses for
drugs that are already on the market, the FDA may well be increasing (or
at least prolonging) these risks. Some commentators have sought to ex-
plain this paradoxical approach to health risks by noting that the FDA is
more likely to be held accountable for harms that result from erroneous
approval of a risky product than for harms that result from the operation
of a disease that might have been treated effectively by a drug that was
not yet approved."l Another explanation is that restricting the sale and
marketing of drugs serves the distinct interest of getting firms to gener-
ate scientifically sound information about drug effects, which can only
be generated through rigorous clinical trials. Because firms are eager to
comply with whatever regulatory requirements stand in the way of bring-
ing new products to market or making promotional claims for their
products, deferring approval until the science is done may be the most
effective way of promoting this interest.
In the case of Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,3 the FDA
advanced this argument explicitly in support of its restrictions on promo-
tion of off-label use, in addition to the more conventional argument
about protecting patients from health risks. That case involved a First
Amendment challenge to FDA "Guidance Documents" from the early
1990s that restricted manufacturer promotion of off-label uses for ap-
proved drugs and devices through the distribution of reprints of
publications and through manufacturer involvement in continuing medi-
cal education programs. The FDA claimed that distribution of these
materials by product manufacturers amounted to unapproved labeling
that rendered the products "misbranded" in violation of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The district court concluded that the
regulated activities amounted to commercial speech and put the burden
102. See, e.g., Mary K. Olson, Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety of Drugs,
45 J.L. & EcON. 615, 618-20 (2002), and citations therein.
103. 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
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on the FDA to show that the regulation was no more extensive than nec-
essary to advance a substantial government interest. ' The FDA
advanced two interests in support of its regulation: (1) ensuring that phy-
sicians receive accurate and unbiased information so that they may make
informed prescription choices; and (2) providing manufacturers with
ample incentive to get previously unapproved uses "on label" by test-
ing them and submitting them to the FDA for approval.' 5 The court
concluded that the first interest was inadequate to justify the intrusion
on speech, but that the second interest-to provide an incentive for
manufacturers to go through strict FDA trials to get off-label uses ap-
proved-was substantial.'0°
Two features of this litigation are particularly interesting. First, it is
remarkable that the FDA explicitly advanced an argument for regulation
as a means of promoting investment in clinical trials, even as a second
line of defense, rather than sticking to traditional patient protection justi-
fications. Second, it is remarkable that the court found the provision of
incentives to conduct clinical trials a more persuasive justification for
regulation than the conventional argument for protecting patients from
risks. Plainly, the functions of FDA regulation have changed over time.
It remains to be seen whether the FDA will advance a similar argu-
ment in the Abigail Alliance case in support of its authority to keep drugs
to treat terminally ill patients off the market pending completion of clini-
cal trials. Given that the patient protection argument is particularly
difficult to sustain when terminally ill patients seek access to unapproved
products, the argument for R&D incentives may be more likely to suc-
ceed. It may also be a more candid account of the FDA's regulatory
goals.
VI. WHY THE GOALS MATTER
Does it matter whether one views FDA regulation as a means of pro-
tecting patients from unsafe or ineffective products or as a means of
promoting investment in clinical trials of drugs? Inasmuch as the infor-
mation to be generated in clinical trials of drugs concerns safety and
efficacy, the two goals may effectively converge for many purposes. Ul-
timately, the reason for promoting the particular types of R&D that FDA
104. Id. at 71-72 (applying the test from Central Hudson Gas & Electic v. Public Ser-
vice Commission of N.Y, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
105. Id.
106. Although the regulations set forth in the FDA Guidance Documents directly ad-
vanced this interest, the court concluded that they were more extensive than necessary,
because this interest could be addressed in a less burdensome manner by simply requiring full
disclosure. Id. at 72-74.
The Role of the FDA
regulation advances is not simply that we value research and innovation
alone, but that we also value public health and safety and believe that
sound clinical trials of new products will advance these goals. Of course,
the same could be said of government involvement in biomedical re-
search more generally. The reason that the budget of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) has grown, even as the budgets of other sci-
ence agencies have languished, is that health-related innovation enjoys
broader political appeal than other scientific pursuits. We value health,
and we believe that high quality biomedical science will have public
health payoffs. FDA regulation similarly promotes public health by pro-
moting high quality scientific investigation of a particular sort-
specifically, the conduct of scientifically rigorous clinical trials of drugs.
Understanding FDA regulation as a means of promoting innovation
diminishes the force of the objection that it is paternalistic for the gov-
ernment to interfere in the drug choices of patients and physicians.
Indeed, by inducing firms to provide better data about the effects of
drugs in patients, FDA regulation permits patients and physicians to
make better autonomous choices in the long run. In the short run, how-
ever, it limits the availability of drugs (and of information about drugs)
pending the completion of clinical trials.
Regulation to motivate clinical trials thus presents a tradeoff be-
tween the interests of current patients and those of future patients. Such
tradeoffs are familiar in the realm of innovation policy: for example, the
patents that promote the development of new drugs tomorrow also per-
mit firms to charge higher prices for currently available drugs today. '07
An innovation-focused perspective on FDA regulation introduces a
number of additional questions about how to best implement that mis-
sion. Although the goal of generating sound data about the effects of
drugs in patients will often converge with the goal of protecting patients
from unjustified risks of harm from unsafe or ineffective products, these
goals might sometimes diverge. Some otherwise anomalous features of
the current regulatory scheme make more sense from the revisionist per-
spective, while other features become harder to justify in this light.
1. What Information? Focusing on FDA regulation as a means of
motivating the provision of information highlights the question of what
information the system should aim to provide. This is an important
question whether the function of regulation is understood from a patient-
protection perspective or from an innovation-incentives perspective.
107. Tradeoffs between the interests of current patients and future patients may be more
troubling from the perspective of medical ethics. Indeed, clinical trials of drugs in patients
often pose conflicts between the medical norm of providing the best possible care for any
given patient and the goal of providing generalizable knowledge through the use of controlled
trials.
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Drugs are typically prescribed by doctors, paid for by health insur-
ers, and consumed by patients. These parties vary greatly in their
preferences for information about drugs, in their capacity to comprehend
and use it, and in their ability to indicate demand for information in the
market for drugs apart from regulation. Information dissemination by
private firms is driven by profit considerations, which leads to gaps and
distortions. The products that firms find worthwhile to advertise are typi-
cally relatively new drugs that are still under patent, available by
prescription only, and covered by health insurance.
The doctors who prescribe drugs are the principal targets of informa-
tion dissemination by pharmaceutical firms, although in recent years
pharmaceutical firms have increasingly advertised their products directly
to patients. Patients who follow the suggestions of advertisements will
ask their doctors to prescribe particular products for them, perhaps as-
suming that their doctors are knowledgeable intermediaries who have
studied available data about the products. Busy physicians, who are also
the targets of aggressive marketing campaigns for these same products,
may find it more expeditious to simply prescribe the products their pa-
tients seek rather than to investigate the data and exercise their own
independent professional judgment about the value of these products.
The insurers that pick up the tab have an interest in controlling drug
costs that might lead them to scrutinize the available data to determine
whether drugs are worth prescribing. One might even imagine that insur-
ers would be motivated to conduct clinical studies of drugs to determine
their value and to decide whether to pay for them. Insurers presumably
have access to patient populations and medical records, putting them in a
good position to observe the relative benefits and harms of different
treatments. They might also be in a good bargaining position to require
proof of safety and efficacy from drug manufacturers as a precondition
to covering their products. In practice, however, insurers do not currently
play a significant role in either generating or demanding information
about drug effects. Insurers rely heavily on physicians to make case by
case prescription decisions, and strategies for getting physicians to con-
trol drug costs could backfire if they slow down the rate at which
individual patients get in and out of the physician's office.
These complexities in the market for drugs suggest a number of rea-
sons why market demand alone might fail to motivate the provision of
reliable information about the effects of drugs in patients. But in the ab-
sence of such market demand, the question of what information is worth
providing has no clear answer.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act calls for the submission
to the FDA of "full reports of investigations which have been made to
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show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use."'' 8 Although this language leaves considerable room for
agency discretion in fine-tuning the standards and determining whether
they have been met, the statute unmistakably calls for decisions to be
based on data from clinical trials that are subject to rigorous scrutiny
rather than mere casual observation and individual clinical experience.'09
The proper design of clinical trials depends on what questions one
asks as well as on what sorts of data one counts as responsive to those
questions. Deciding what questions to ask is not a purely scientific or
technocratic judgment. It depends on what one wants to know, which is
ultimately a matter of value-laden preferences. For example, in an earlier
era the FDA generally preferred the submission of data from a homoge-
nous population of subjects that would permit isolation of drug effects
from other variables, with the result that clinical trials were conducted
primarily in white men. Today, the statute explicitly calls for regulators,
in consultation with industry, to "develop guidance, as appropriate, on
the inclusion of women and minorities in clinical trials.""' Data gathered
from a more diverse set of patients are noisier but may be more relevant
to clinical practice, offering a better preview of how future patients will
react to the drug."' Science alone cannot say which approach is better.
Another important judgment call concerns whether products should
be tested against alternative treatments, placebos, or both. It is common
in scientific experiments to use both positive and negative controls, yet
clinical trials of drugs typically use only a negative control. The FDA has
traditionally regarded placebo-controlled trials as a "gold standard" for
establishing safety and efficacy. But placebo-controlled trials are consid-
ered unethical when patients face significant risks from a disease for
which there is already an existing therapy, making it necessary to use the
108.. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) calls for the submission of "adequate tests by all methods rea-
sonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use" and "substantial evidence
that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of
use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof," with "substan-
tial evidence" defined as "evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations,
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and re-
sponsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling or proposed labeling thereof."
110. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G).
111. Data from trials in heterogeneous populations of research subjects may also suggest
variations in drug response, leading to further trials in subgroups of responders of products
that might otherwise have failed to win approval. A recent example is BiDil, a drug approved
for the treatment of heart failure in self-identified black patients. See Jerry Avorn, FDA Stan-
dards-Good Enough for Government Work?, 353 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 969 (2005).
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existing therapy as a control in trials of new products for the same indi-
cation. From a scientific perspective, each approach has its advantages
and its limitations.
Some observers have noted that the current system does a better job
of testing short-term effects than long-term effects of drugs."2 This is
partly because of cost constraints involved in monitoring long-term ef-
fects, and partly because it is easier to motivate firms to comply with
pre-market testing requirements that stand in the way of making sales
than it is to get them to continue testing products after they are on the
market. This focus on clinical trials in the pre-marketing stage limits the
information that is generated. Such trials typically involve no more than
a few thousand selected patients using a product over a period of
months, and thus fail to reveal long-term effects of a drug when it is pre-
scribed across a large population under real-life conditions. Post-
marketing studies are more likely to reveal information about rare side
effects, long-term effects, and drug interactions.
Viewing FDA regulation as a means of promoting the provision of in-
formation, it might make sense to shift the emphasis toward more post-
marketing studies under regulatory supervision, instead of requiring de-
finitive clinical test results before a product may be sold. In fact, in recent
years the FDA has made increasing use of postmarketing requirements for
continued testing of drugs. 1 3 One example has been the practice of ap-
proving the sale of new products under "fast-track" procedures while
postmarketing studies continue, in the interest of getting products to
market more quickly for treatment of life-threatening conditions such as
cancer and AIDS. Congress endorsed this innovation in the Food and
Drug Modernization Act of 1997." The FDA also sometimes enters into
agreements with sponsors to conduct post-marketing studies in the
course of negotiations over the approval of a new product that is not on a
fast-track. But sponsor compliance with post-marketing study require-
ments has been poor, revealing a serious pragmatic constraint on the
FDA's leverage over firms once their products are on the market." 5
From the manufacturer's perspective, once a product is on the mar-
ket further testing in long-term trials is potentially very risky. Consider
112. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT
NEEDED IN FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS, GAO-06-402
(2006); JAY S. COHEN, OVERDOSE: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG COMPANIES-
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, SIDE EFFECTS, ANDYOUR HEALTH (2001).
113. For a critical review of this development, see Charles Steenburg, The Food and
Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the
Rule? 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295 (2006).
114. Codified in pertinent part at 21 U.S.C. § 356.
115. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA's MONITOR-
ING OF POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS (2006).
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the NIH Women's Health Initiative study on the effects of hormone re-
placement therapy (HRT) on the risk of heart disease in post-menopausal
women." 6 Although the FDA had only approved the use of HRT for re-
lief of menopause symptoms, prior observational studies had suggested
that women who take HRT have a lower risk of heart disease. This evi-
dence, although not definitive, was good enough to bring about
widespread off-label prescription and use of HRT for the purpose of re-
ducing the risk of heart disease. HRT manufacturers, although formally
prohibited from actively promoting HRT for this untested purpose, none-
theless enjoyed significantly expanded sales from prescriptions in
reliance on the results of the prior observational studies, and stood to
gain little from subjecting doctors' beliefs in the benefits of its product to
more rigorous tests. When the NIH, not the manufacturer, finally con-
ducted a long-term, randomized, controlled study involving over 16,000
patients, early results indicated an increased risk of heart disease (as
well as increased risks of other diseases) in women receiving HRT.
While this information is undoubtedly valuable to patients, physicians,
health insurers, and policy makers, it has sharply reduced sales of Prem-
pro, a widely used HRT."7 In this case, government funding provided
valuable and credible information that the product's manufacturer had
little incentive to uncover on its own.
Sometimes firms conduct post-marketing studies of approved drugs
in the hope of getting supplemental NDAs for new indications, despite
the costs and risks. A striking recent example of both the costs and risks
is Merck's trial of Vioxx-a product previously approved by the FDA for
treatment of specific types of pain and inflammation"--for the
supplemental indication of preventing recurrence of colonic polyps.
Vioxx sales were running at $2.5 billion per year before Merck removed
it from the market after observing cardiovascular side effects in the
course of these post-marketing studies." 9
116. Writing Group for the Women's Health Initiative Investigators, Risks and Benefits
of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal Results From the
Women's Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321 (2002). More recent
results are equivocal, suggesting that the risks and benefits of HRT may vary with age and
years since menopause. J.E. Rossouw et al., Postmenopausal Hormone Therapy and Risk of
Cardiovascular Disease by Age and Years Since Menopause. JAMA 2007;297:1465-1477.
117. According to a front page story in the New York Times, the manufacturer of Prem-
pro (Wyeth) estimates that the number of women taking Prempro fell from 2.7 million to 1.5
million following the announcement of the study results. Gina Kolata et al., Menopause With-
out Pills: Rethinking Hot Flashes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at Al.
118. See FDA, COX-2 Selective (Includes Bextra, Celebrex, and Vioxx) and Non-
Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugl
infopage/COX2/default.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
119. See Barbara Martinez et al., Merck Pulls Vioxx From Market After Link to Heart Prob-
lems, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2004, at Al. The trial results are reported in Robert S. Bresalier et al.,
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Why would Merck put the revenues from an already successful
product at risk by conducting an additional clinical trial? The extensive
media attention paid to Vioxx offers a rare glimpse behind the scenes of
such decision-making, 20 revealing that marketing considerations and
FDA oversight both played significant roles. The ostensible purpose of
the study was to allow Merck to expand the market for Vioxx to include
patients at risk of recurring colonic polyps. Although doctors were free
to prescribe Vioxx off-label for this purpose, more aggressive marketing
might have been necessary to get doctors to adopt an expensive drug, for
a prophylactic indication, against a relatively minor condition. Merck
needed FDA approval before it could actively promote Vioxx for this
new indication. Moreover, a similar study was already underway for
Pfizer's rival product, Celebrex,' 2' threatening to put Merck at a market-
ing disadvantage if Celebrex were approved for an indication that
remained off-label for Vioxx. Another purpose of the study, less touted
but perhaps no less important, was to investigate (and hopefully put to
rest) early concerns about the safety of Vioxx. Data from an early study
comparing Vioxx to naproxen suggested an increased risk of cardiovas-
cular events for patients receiving Vioxx. 22 Although Merck took the
optimistic position at the time that this difference reflected a protective
effect of naproxen rather than a toxic effect of Vioxx,'23 both Merck and
the FDA thought the cardiovascular effects of Vioxx called for further
study.' 24 Merck's marketing executives were reluctant to conduct a trial
focused on cardiovascular effects directly for fear of signaling concerns
about the product, and preferred to observe cardiovascular side effects in
a study designed to prove the value of the product for additional indica-
125tions.
Cardiovascular Events Associated with Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprenvion
Trial, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1092 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to
Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TuMEs, Nov. 14, 2004, at C1; Martinez, supra note 119.
121. Gideon Steinbach et al., The Effect of Celecoxib, A Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor in
Familial Adenomatous Polyposis, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1946 (2000); Scott D. Solomon et
al., Cardiovascular Risk Associated with Celecoxib in a Clinical Trial for Colorectal Adenorna
Prevention, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1071 (2005).
122. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofe-
coxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000).
Naproxen is sold under the brand name "Aleve".
123. Id. at 1526; Peter S. Kim et al., Rofecoxib, Merck & the FDA, 351 NEW ENG J.
MED. 2875 (2004).
124. See Berenson et al., supra note 120.
125. Id. Some observers have criticized the FDA and Merck for failing to pursue a study
focused directly on cardiovascular effects. Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health: Rofecoxib,
Merck & the FDA, 351 N. ENGLAND J. MED. 1707 (2004). Such a study, however, would have
been less informative than a study that tests efficacy as well as safety. In fact, the study re-
vealed that Vioxx is effective in preventing recurrence of colonic polyps. Information about
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The fact that Merck undertook such a long-term post-marketing
study suggests that the system sometimes works to motivate the devel-
opment of rigorous information, even at considerable risk of
undermining the commercial interests of sponsors. On the other hand,
the disastrous outcome for Merck might give other drug manufacturers
pause about undertaking postmarketing trials of successful products in
the future.
A significant limitation of the FDA regulatory system as a driver of
information provision is that it only works when the manufacturer can
recover the cost of obtaining the information, which usually means that
sponsors conduct studies only on drugs with some remaining patent life.
Otherwise, the market for information-laden drugs fails for the same rea-
sons that markets for other information goods fail: competitors can share
in the benefits of the information without sharing in the costs of produc-
ing it. 2 6 Suppose the manufacturer of an unpatented vitamin or dietary
supplement believes that it could increase demand for its product by
conducting clinical trials to convince skeptics that it is safe and effective.
At best, the seller would have to share the expanded market with com-
petitors who did not share in the cost of information provision. Worse,
the trials might show that the product is unsafe or ineffective, causing
loss of sales. The trials thus look like a poor investment, even though
consumers of the product might value the information greatly. The pro-
visions in the Hatch-Waxman Act conferring years of exclusivity before
a generic competitor may enter the market through use of an ANDA (as
opposed to the costlier NDA) are an effort to limit this sort of free-riding
on expensive data for products that are no longer under patent. One
could expand this approach to promote the testing of other unpatented
products, such as vitamins, although consumers who are accustomed to
buying such products at competitive prices might object to the higher
prices for products available from a sole source. But while market exclu-
sivity may help a firm to capture the benefits of favorable clinical trial
results, it does nothing to help a firm recover from the revenue loss asso-
ciated with unfavorable trial results.
Weaker regulation of vitamins and dietary supplements may make
sense given the inability of manufacturers to capture the value of clinical
trials. If dietary supplements were subjected to the same regulatory stan-
dards as patented drugs, the most likely result would not be improved
the side effects of a drug is only meaningful in the context of information about its therapeutic
benefits, permitting users to weigh risks against benefits.
126. Generic drugs also require FDA approval, but generic equivalents of previously
approved products can win approval through a streamlined (and considerably cheaper) abbre-
viated new drug application (ANDA) without having to comply with the full regulatory
requirements for a standard new drug application (NDA). 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
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information provision, but the disappearance of these products from the
market. It may also be a sensible response to the information preferences
of the consumers of these products: consumers who buy ginseng might
care less about clinical trials conducted in accordance with modem sci-
ence than they care about extensive prior use in China over a period of
many centuries. A benefit of the current uneven regulatory regime is that
consumers often have a choice between costly, information-rich pharma-
ceutical products and less expensive dietary supplements that may be
sold without the burdens and benefits of costly clinical trials.
2. Data Disclosure. One aspect of the current regulatory regime that
merits criticism when considered from the information provision per-
spective is the treatment of data submitted to the FDA as proprietary
information of the sponsor not subject to public disclosure. The pharma-
ceutical industry has long taken the position that data from clinical trials
of drugs are a trade secret belonging to the submitting firm, and the FDA
has consistently supported this position 2 and withheld the data from
public disclosure as a matter of administrative practice, 28 although the
statutory language invoked in support of this position is ambiguous.
2 9
127. Although the FDA does not disclose the underlying data, it requires disclosure of
certain information in the labeling of approved products. Moreover, in recent years the FDA has
begun putting more information about approved products up on its website, including analyses of
the data from clinical trials by FDA staff. See, e.g., FDA, Label and Approval History,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label-
ApprovalHistory (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (information about Vioxx).
128. See, e.g., Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44601, at 44611-12 (Dec. 24, 1974)
(reviewing public comments on proposed regulations to implement the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act)("The Food and Drug Administration has on numerous occasions testified before
Congress that current statutory prohibitions prevent disclosure of useful information contained
in the agency's files, and particularly, data relating to the safety and effectiveness of drugs.
The Food and Drug Administration cannot change the law, and thus is bound by the present
provisions until Congress acts."); Public Information, 42 Fed. Reg. 3094, 3106 (Jan. 14, 1977)
(noting that the FDA has treated data from clinical trials as a trade secret since 1938); Ander-
son v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1990); Pub. Citizen Health
Research Group v. FDA, 997 F Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1998).
129. Proponents of trade secrecy have relied upon § 3010) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, which prohibits:
The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than to the Secre-
tary or officers or employees of the Department, or to the courts when relevant in
any judicial proceeding under this Act, any information acquired under authority of
section [505] . .. concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is enti-
tled to protection.
21 U.S.C. § 331(). It is by no means obvious from the statutory language that "any method or
process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection" includes data from clinical trials,
although the longstanding administrative practice would make it difficult to adopt a narrower
reading of the provision at this point. See James T. O'Reilly, Knowledge is Power: Legislative
Control of Drug Industry Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1985); Richard S. Fortunato,
Note, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data: The Scope of Section 301(i), 52 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1280 (1983-84).
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Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as part of the
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 appear to require that safety and efficacy
data for a drug be made available to the public, "unless extraordinary
circumstances are shown," as soon as the Hatch-Waxman periods of data
exclusivity have expired and an ANDA "could be made effective if such
an application had been submitted"'O So far, however, the industry has
successfully resisted a plain meaning interpretation of this provision. 3'
Trade secrecy and FDA regulation are intertwined at a number of
levels. At least as a historical matter, pre-Hatch-Waxman, an important
component of the value of safety and efficacy data from the perspective
of drug manufacturers lay in the fact that it was required to overcome
regulatory entry barriers.'32 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
requires the submission of "full reports"'33 of clinical trials to comply
with the requirements for an NDA, which has long been understood to
require submission of the underlying data rather than just published
summaries. If competitors could gain access to the data, they could use it
to submit their own NDAs to the FDA to bring generic versions of previ-
ously approved products to market without having to incur the cost and
risk of doing their own trials.
This concern about free riders using publicly available data to get
approval to sell a generic product in competition with a pioneer drug was
arguably more substantial prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act than it is today.
Under current law, generic competitors are effectively permitted to rely
upon data previously submitted to the FDA for a bioequivalent product
through the use of an ANDA once the statutory periods of data exclusivity
have expired."'4 It is possible that a generic competitor might use publicly
available data to submit its own full NDA (as distinguished from the
streamlined ANDA) prior to the end of the data exclusivity
period if all the listed patents have expired or are invalid, but the
Hatch-Waxman Act does not require public disclosure until the time
when an ANDA could become effective.'35 The FDA will not approve a
generic product on the basis of an ANDA until applicable data
exclusivity periods and patents have expired. At that point, with or
without disclosure of the underlying data, current law permits free riding
on prior studies through use of an ANDA. The generic firm need only
130. Section 104 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 98 Stat. 1597 (1984) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(1)).
131. See Jane A. Fisher, Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness Data under the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. J. 268 (1986).
132. O'Reilly, supra note 129.
133. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). See supra text accompanying note 108.
134. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 355(1)(5).
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show that its product is bioequivalent to a previously approved product
and has no regulatory need to replicate the data through its own trials.
By permitting substantial free-riding even without access to the
underlying data, the Hatch-Waxman Act has thus taken the wind out of
the sails of an argument against data disclosure that rests upon protection
from free riders.
36
The social benefits of disclosure of data from clinical trials are con-
siderable. Publicly available data would permit patients, doctors, and
insurers to make better choices of drugs. To the extent that data disclo-
sure is valuable to these customers, one might expect them to exert
market pressure on firms to provide it. Indeed, trade secrecy is a tricky
strategy for information-dependent products like drugs, because firms
need to make some disclosure of product information in order to capture
its value. On the other hand, firms might be reluctant to disclose negative
data that would diminish sales of their products. Trade secrecy allows
firms to pursue a strategy of selective disclosure of favorable information
from clinical trials, although perhaps with some loss of credibility for
their claims.
FDA regulation may enable firms to sustain trade secrecy for com-
petitively valuable information while still capturing some of its value to
customers. FDA approval, in consultation with panels of independent
experts, serves a certification function that enhances the credibility of
informational claims about products while preserving substantial secrecy
of the underlying data. FDA regulation combines bureaucratization of
study design and data analysis with a system of scientific peer review
and certification of undisclosed data. In the process, it standardizes the
data that is collected and the format in which summary information is
disclosed to the public, clarifying and simplifying the information given
to a public that is unable to evaluate the data for itself. FDA personnel
review the data, and some portions of the data may be disclosed to out-
side experts to assist the FDA in evaluating the safety and efficacy of the
product. The FDA discloses considerable information to the public along
with its conclusion that it finds the product safe and effective for a par-
ticular indication, including approval history, supporting analyses by
FDA staff, and correspondence,'37 but the underlying data are not dis-
closed. Some disclosure of data occurs in summary form through the
required labeling that must accompany the product in the market. The
audience to whom these disclosures are directed is clinical decision-
136. It is also possible that the data could be used to secure regulatory approval to sell
generic products in foreign markets.
137. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Launches New Easy-to-Use Drug Information Web
Site (Mar. 3, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/NEWO1031.html.
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makers. In the case of a product that is available by prescription only, the
disclosure in the labeling must be provided to prescribing physicians. In
the case of an OTC product, it must be provided to patients and written
in terms that are meaningful to them. The sponsors of a clinical trial, or
the doctors and scientists carrying out the trial, might make further dis-
closures through publications or press releases, but they typically do not
disclose the raw data.
From a patient protection perspective, this approach may be good
enough, although it can be criticized as depriving patients and physicians
of information that some of them might choose to scrutinize with greater
care to make fully informed decisions. As a practical matter, the provi-
sion of summary information in the product label may well be all that
most of these information users want.
But to the extent that FDA regulation is justified as a means of pro-
moting the generation of socially valuable information, keeping the
resulting information secret seems to restrict its social value. The data
may, for example, alert other firms to hazards associated with a class of
products, highlight the relative virtues of competing products, or point to
potential new uses that merit further investigation. Secrecy permits firms
to withhold this value from competitors, while exploiting it for them-
selves. But secrecy carries a considerable social cost. Public availability
of data from clinical trials would allow firms to learn from each other's
experience so that they could design better products and conduct better
trials in the future. It would spare firms from having to continuously re-
invent the wheel. It would steer them away from carrying out costly
trials of products that are likely to fail, potentially bringing down the
staggering average costs of new drug development.' It would permit
reanalysis of data by skeptical competitors in ways that might challenge
the spin selected by the product's sponsor, and facilitate meta-analysis of
aggregated data from multiple studies of related products.
The loss from secrecy is likely to be compounded as progress in in-
formation technology opens up greater possibilities for data mining
across numerous studies. Treating data as proprietary makes it difficult
to analyze data from more than one product at a time. Combining data
from multiple studies could provide powerful information about side
effects and toxicities that are too rare to give rise to statistically signifi-
cant observations in a single study limited to a few thousand patients.
Although some toxicities are drug specific, and aggregation will thus not
offer any advantage, other toxicities arise from variability across patients
in drug metabolism enzymes and are likely to give some patients similar
problems with multiple drugs. Such effects might be easier to observe by
138. See supra note 15 and sources cited therein.
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looking at results from multiple studies, particularly as the field of
pharmacogenomics advances, as information technology improves, and
as a growing understanding of the genetic basis of disease and drug re-
sponse makes it possible to direct queries to data from multiple studies
of different drugs in different patient populations.
Public disclosure would subject the basis for regulatory decisions to
scrutiny, helping to ensure that decisions are well-grounded scientifi-
cally. It would permit independent analysis by scientists and institutions
that do not share the agenda of the sponsor, providing a valuable check
on distortions that arise from the wish to profit from hoped-for product
sales. It might also provide answers to questions that neither the sponsor
nor the FDA had thought to ask.
Although assurances of confidentiality for submitted data are not
uncommon in the context of health and safety regulation,'" government
initiatives to promote innovation often call for eventual disclosure of
new data. The patent system provides for full disclosure of patent speci-
fications, 40 and judicial opinions celebrate this disclosure of information
pertaining to patented technology as a means of promoting further inno-
vation that provides a "quid pro quo" for the patent monopoly.'1
4
Sponsored research programs also sometimes call for public disclosure
of data, although such requirements may face resistance from investiga-
tors with an interest in restricting access to data to their collaborators.
The National Institutes of Health recently issued a statement on data
sharing that requires all grant applicants seeking $500,000 or more "to
include a plan for data sharing or state why data sharing is not possible"
' 42
as a part of their grant applications. They cite a compelling list of ar-
guments in support of data sharing, including reinforcing open scientific
inquiry, facilitating new research, encouraging diversity of analysis and
opinions, enabling the exploration of topics not envisioned by the origi-
nal investigators, and permitting the creation of new data sets that
combine data from different sources.
The FDA is sitting on a treasure trove of data that could accelerate
the pace of pharmaceutical R&D, and is withholding it from public scru-
tiny under questionable statutory authority based on a longstanding
administrative practice that has outlived its original justification.
139. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Thomas 0. McGarity &
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reform-
ing Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REv. 837 (1980).
140. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122(b).
141. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (citing Uni-
versal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (Disclosure is
"the quidpro quo of the right to exclude.")).
142. NIH, Final NIH Statement on Data Sharing (Feb. 26, 2003), http://grantsl.nih.gov/
grants/guide/notice-fileslNOT-OD-03-032.html.
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3. The Trigger for Approval. Another question that emerges from re-
considering FDA regulation as a means of promoting provision of
information concerns appropriate requirements for new product approv-
als. The current requirement of demonstrating safety and efficacy prior
to approval follows tautologically from the goal of protecting patients
from unsafe or ineffective products, although not necessarily from a
more broadly articulated goal of protecting the health of patients. But to
the extent that regulation serves a distinct goal of promoting the provi-
sion of information, with the mechanism of premarket approval serving
to exploit the greater leverage that the FDA holds over drug developers at
this stage, it might be argued that the submission of sufficient data from
rigorous testing should be the trigger for approval, even if the data tell an
equivocal story about safety and efficacy.
This argument invites a number of objections that highlight the
complex role played by the FDA in the current regulatory scheme. The
current focus on safety and efficacy not only frames the inquiry but also
guides determinations of how much evidence is necessary to meet the
standard. Results from earlier studies may reveal limitations that prompt
requirements for further studies. The endpoint of the inquiry is a moving
target that cannot easily be specified in advance.
Moreover, FDA approval currently plays an important certification
role that would be lost if approval were no longer contingent upon satis-
faction of a standard for safety and efficacy but merely upon submission
of data. In the current system, the data from clinical trials are proprie-
tary, and FDA certification is therefore an important signal about what
the data reveal. The fact that FDA scientists and their expert advisors
have determined that a product is safe and effective for a particular indi-
cation is a valuable proxy for informed decision making by patients,
doctors, payors, and policy makers. If product approval ceased to be a
signal of safety and efficacy and meant nothing more than that the perti-
nent data were on file with the agency, the fact of FDA approval would
lose this value, although other certification mechanisms could be substi-
tuted.
Some critics of the FDA have proposed that the function of
certifying drugs as safe and effective could be performed by private
firms rather than by a government agency, much as the American
Automobile Association (AAA) certifies the cleanliness of roadside
motels and Underwriters' Laboratories (UL) certifies the safety of
electrical products. 4 3 But the recent history of scandals in the accounting
industry highlights problems with relying on private experts to certify
143. E.g., HENRY I. MILLER, To AMERICA'S HEALTH: A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2000).
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the quality of information generated by their clients. The firms with the
most pertinent expertise (e.g., contract research organizations that
currently specialize in designing and conducting clinical trials of drugs
on behalf of pharmaceutical firms) may have or seek other profitable
dealings with the firms whose data they are certifying, calling into
question the trustworthiness of the review. As drug development and the
selection of drugs for particular patients becomes more specialized with
advances in pharmacogenomics, the certification function is likely to
become more important and complex. Scientific credibility is difficult to
establish and fragile to maintain, cautioning against radical departure
from a system that enjoys some current credibility.
4. Alternative Mechanisms. We currently look primarily to private
firms to generate information about the effects of drugs in patients, rely-
ing on regulation to constrain their palpable incentives to cheat in
developing and selectively disclosing information in order to sell more
of their products. But this is not the only option.
Rather than compelling private sponsors to conduct their own clini-
cal trials and allowing them to control access to the resulting data, one
might use publicly-funded clinical trials (such as the HRT study funded
by NIH) to generate information for the public about the effects of drugs.
Currently the National Center for Comparative and Alternative Medicine
(NCCAM) has conducted rigorous clinical trials on some popular herbal
remedies and nutriceuticals, such as echinacea, glucosamine/chondroitin,
and St. John's wort, '" which were allowed to reach the market without
testing for safety and efficacy. Since these products are typically unpat-
ented, it is unlikely that private manufacturers would be willing to
conduct costly clinical trials even if they were required as a condition for
continuing to market the products. These NCCAM trials may indicate
what we could expect from a system that leaves clinical trials of mini-
mally regulated products to the government.
Ultimately, of course, there are limits to our political will to tax our-
selves to pay for clinical trials. From a taxpayer perspective, a significant
virtue of the current system is that it puts the costs of clinical trials on
drug companies and the consumers who use the specific drug, and not on
the public as a whole. Perhaps public resources should be deployed se-
lectively to fortify the information base in areas where regulation is
unlikely to induce private firms to conduct the necessary trials. This con-
sideration might be one way of explaining the sometimes criticized
distinction in current law between minimally regulated dietary supple-
144. Research and clinical trial results may be accessed through the website of the Na-
tional Center for Comparative and Alternative Medicine. NCCAM, Research Results, http://
nccam.nih.gov/research/results/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
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ments (such as vitamins and herbal remedies) and heavily regulated
drugs. Although the distinction makes little sense from a consumer pro-
tection perspective, from the alternative perspective of promoting the
development of information it makes sense to focus regulation on prod-
ucts that are potentially lucrative enough to allow sponsors to recover the
costs of regulatory compliance. Imposing similar burdens on unpatented
vitamins and herbal remedies that are sold in competitive markets would
generate no further information, but would simply lead to the withdrawal
of these products from the market. By placing the burden on the gov-
ernment to show that these products are unsafe and relying on the
government to pay for the testing, we pay lip service to consumer protec-
tion while preserving markets for information-poor products that some
consumers nonetheless want to buy.
Another obvious alternative is the tort system. Fear of tort liability
for the sale of unsafe products should give firms some motivation to
learn about the effects of drugs in patients and to withhold from the mar-
ket products with risks that plainly outweigh their benefits. Moreover, at
least in theory, the prospect of tort liability for failure to warn about
product risks should give firms an incentive to disclose these risks to the
public. On the other hand, given that tort law places the burden of proof
upon plaintiffs, drug manufacturers might minimize their liability expo-
sure by remaining ignorant and keeping consumers ignorant of the
effects of their products. Concerns about tort liability would presumably
aggravate the downside risk of conducting trials that could expose oth-
erwise unsuspected toxicities, deterring firms from learning more about
their products rather than motivating them to do further tests. Reliance
on the determinations of inexpert juries adds more uncertainty to the sys-
tem, making tort liability a clumsy vehicle at best for motivating the
development of sound information about drug effects.
CONCLUSION
As traditionally understood, the function of the FDA has been to
protect consumers from dangerous or fraudulently marketed products.
But as the practices and statutory authorities of the FDA have evolved,
the agency has also come to play an important role in structuring
incentives for biopharmaceutical innovation. These two functions are not
entirely distinct from one another, and they have become closer over
time. Sometimes the FDA uses its market gatekeeper role to perform a
patent-like function of protecting innovators from competition from
generic versions of new drugs. Regulatory sources of exclusivity have
become more important as development times for new drugs have
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lengthened, cutting further into product patent terms, and as industry
"evergreening" strategies to secure additional follow-on patents have
encountered obstacles in the courts. Even the FDA's core function of
reviewing data from clinical trials to determine the safety and efficacy of
drugs prior to market approval may be understood as a means of
promoting costly investments in a particular form of R&D rather than
simply as a means of protecting patients from untoward risks of harm.
Indeed, some otherwise puzzling features of the FDA's current
regulatory authorities make more sense from the perspective of
promoting provision of information than from the perspective of
protecting patients. At the same time, examination of FDA regulations
from the perspective of information provision raises new questions about
the current system and may shed light on the strengths and weaknesses
of particular mechanisms for regulating this important science-based
industry.
